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 1 
FORENSIC COLLECTION OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE FROM 
INFRASTRUCTURE-AS-A-SERVICE CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
Josiah Dykstra* 
Damien Riehl** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] As cloud computing becomes ubiquitous, the criminal targeting 
and criminal use of cloud computing is inevitable and imminent.  
Similarly, the need for civil forensic analyses of cloud computing has 
become more prevalent.  Forensic investigation of cloud computing 
matters first requires an understanding of the technology and issues 
associated with the collection of electronically stored information (“ESI”) 
in the cloud.  The misuse of the broad term “cloud computing” has caused 
some confusion and misinformation among legal and technology scholars, 
leading to a muddied and incomplete analysis of cloud-based discovery 
issues.  Cases and academic analyses have dealt primarily with popular 
online services such as Gmail and Facebook, but they omit discussions of 
commercial cloud computing providers’ fundamental infrastructure 
offerings.1   Even worse, legal analysis about electronic discovery is 
                                                
* PhD., Computer Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, expected 2013; 
M.S., Information Assurance, Iowa State University, 2004; B.S., Computer Science, 
Hope College, 2002; B.A., Music, Hope College, 2002.  Thanks to Mark Rasch, Alan T. 
Sherman, Simson Garfinkel, Daniel Dykstra, and Donald Flynn who read prior versions 
of this Essay and provided helpful comments. 
** Attorney with Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., practicing in business litigation 
and intellectual property litigation, focusing on cases involving technology. The opinions 
expressed here are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
firm or its clients.  This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to 
be and should not be taken as legal advice. 
1 See infra Part II.A. 
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largely devoid of authority concerning cloud-computing services.2  As 
cloud computing becomes a large and necessary part of our computing 
existence, policymakers and jurists should carefully analyze how the law 
should best approach forensic acquisition and analysis of digital artifacts 
hosted by remote cloud service providers. 
 
[2] In early 2011, Sony was the victim of an online data breach that 
took down the PlayStation Network.3  To commit that crime, the intruder 
used Amazon’s public cloud.4  The FBI investigated the crime, but very 
little information was made public.  For example, neither Amazon nor the 
FBI would comment on whether the former was served with a search 
warrant or subpoena.5  This is likely the first publicly known case of a 
cloud-related crime, though many more are bound to emerge.  Civil cases 
more frequently address online discovery—most often in the context of 
services like Gmail or Facebook—but fewer cases have addressed cloud-
computing infrastructures like Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), 
                                                
2 See generally H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL.,U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND 
SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 115-51(2009) [hereinafter “DOJ MANUAL”], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf.  The vendors of the 
two most popular forensic tools, Guidance EnCase and AccessData FTK, also publish 
documents describing the electronic discovery process and cases where their products 
were used; neither mentions cloud forensic acquisition, analysis, or legal precedent.  See 
generally GUIDANCE SOFTWARE, ENCASE LEGAL JOURNAL (2011), 
http://www.guidancesoftware.com/DocumentRegistration.aspx?did=1000017380&id=25
25; ACCESSDATA CORP., THE RULES OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ACCESSDATA 
TECHNOLOGY, 
http://accessdata.com/downloads/media/Rules_of_Digital_Evidence_and_AccessData_T
echnology.pdf. 
3 News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION NETWORK, 
http://us.playstation.com/news/consumeralerts/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).  
4 See Joseph Galante, Olga Kharif & Pavel Alpeyev, Sony Network Breach Shows 
Amazon Cloud’s Appeal for Hackers, BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2011, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-15/sony-attack-shows-amazon-s-cloud-
service-lures-hackers-at-pennies-an-hour.html.  
5 Id. 
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Microsoft Azure, or Rackspace.6  Given cloud computing’s intricacies, the 
courts will likely continue to struggle with the technology’s inherent 
complexities. 
 
[3] This article discusses some challenges involved with electronic 
discovery and digital forensics arising from cloud computing 
infrastructure as a service, arguing that the nature of cloud computing 
challenges the process and product of electronic discovery.  We conclude 
that although existing rules and doctrines—the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Fourth 
Amendment—are appropriately applied to the forensic acquisition and 
analysis of cloud-based ESI, this technology requires adapting these rules 
with novel interpretations.  We make the following claims: (1) online 
users have an expectation of the geographic location of their data and thus, 
the laws protecting that data; (2) cloud providers should not be permitted 
to execute subpoenas and search warrants on behalf of law enforcement 
without rigorous guidelines, including challenges to the searches’ scope 
and procedure; and (3) remote forensics of the remote service provider’s 
forum should be governed by the laws of the remote service provider.  
 
[4] Part II defines the technologies and clarifies terms.  Part III surveys 
cases involving cloud forensics, discussing how the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Fourth 
Amendment apply to cloud forensics.  Part IV takes a contrasting view, 
analyzing how parties might undermine cloud-derived evidence. 
 
II.  OVERVIEW OF CLOUD TECHNOLOGY 
 
[5] Cloud computing is still an emerging technology, but its use is 
                                                
6 Compare Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 
F.R.D. 430, 432 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (discussing discovery regarding social media sites), 
with Global Sessions LP v. Travelocity.com LP, No. 6:10cv671, 2012 WL 1903903, at 
*10 (E.D. Tex. May 25, 2012) (discussing discovery regarding EC2), and RealPage, Inc. 
v. Yardi Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-00690-ODW, 2012 WL 443730, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 
2012) (discussing discovery of generic cloud computing services like Rackspace). 
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expanding at a blistering pace.7  In 2011, the United States Government 
implemented a “Cloud First” policy, requiring that before federal agencies 
make any new investments, they must evaluate cloud-computing 
solutions—citing the “considerable benefits to efficiency, agility, or 
innovation.” 8   As such, several government agencies have already 
implemented cloud solutions,9 and many more are anticipated to do so in 
the coming years.10  Despite this mandate and rush to cloud computing, 
some policy makers, law enforcement, and forensic investigators do not 
appear to understand the nuances to investigating incidents and crimes in 
the cloud, nor do they fully appreciate the implications in civil discovery.  
Private companies are similarly rushing to cloud computing at a blistering 
pace.11  Surveys indicate that most companies use cloud computing,12 and 
                                                
7 See Saul Berman et al., The Power of Cloud, IBM, 2-3 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/us/en/assets/power-of-cloud-for-bus-model-
innovation.pdf. 
8 See VIVEK KUNDRA, FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY 19 (Feb. 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.cio.gov/documents/federal-cloud-computing-strategy.pdf. 
9 See, e.g., Steve Hoffman, GSA Becomes First Federal Agency to Move Email to the 
Cloud Agencywide (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/208417; see also 
Government Cloud Computing, CLOUDBOOK, http://www.cloudbook.net/directories/gov-
clouds/government-cloud-computing.php (last visited May 31, 2012) (compiling list of 
government agencies that have adopted cloud computing, including Department of 
Energy, NASA, National Science Foundation, National Institute of Standards & 
Technology, and others).  
10 Google’s SaaS cloud service has obtained ISO 27001 certification for security 
techniques.  Thomas Claburn, Google Apps Clears Key Security Hurdle, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (May 29, 2012 3:05 pm), 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/cloud-computing/software/240001126.  
Microsoft announced a separate cloud product for government: Office 365 for 
Government.  Kirk Koenigsbauer, Announcing Office 365 for Government: A US 
Government Community Cloud, OFFICE 365 (May 30, 2012), 
http://blogs.office.com/b/microsoft_office_365_blog/archive/2012/05/30/announcing-
office-365-for-government-a-us-government-community-cloud.aspx.  Both of these 
developments are sure to rapidly increase government adoption of cloud services. 
11 See, e.g., Berman et al., supra note 7. 
12 See Smriti Sharma, 74 Percent Companies Using Cloud Services, GLOBAL SERVICES 
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.globalservicesmedia.com/IT-Outsourcing/Infrastructure-
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many use multiple cloud services.13  Given its rapid adoption, cloud 
computing has serious legal implications in the United States and around 
the world.  But before analyzing and developing the law, one must first 
understand the technology. 
 
[6] Legal scholars and practitioners have long made analogies between 
computer hard drives and filing cabinets. 14   Paul Ohm made this 
observation: “Warehouses—and even less so filing cabinets—are 
insignificant containers of information compared to today’s hard drives, 
and the analogy will only become more mismatched over time.”15  To 
extend Ohm’s analogy (warehouses and filing cabinets) to cloud-based 
data requires the following modification: cut up each document, store each 
piece in a different locked filing cabinet, and distribute all those cabinets 
to different warehouses around the world.  As Ohm concluded, “Today’s 
technology poses a constitutional puzzle that is different in kind, not just 
in degree, from the one solved only a few decades ago.”16 
 
A.  Cloud Computing 
 
[7] Cloud computing is a broad, generic term with many proffered 
                                                                                                                     
Management/74-Percent-Companies-Using-Cloud-
Services/22/6/12123/GS1204209710723.  
13 See Meghan Kelly, 86 Percent of Companies Use Multiple Cloud Services, Says Study, 
VENTURE BEAT (May 10, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/05/10/cloud-services-data/ 
(surveying one company’s 3,200 customers in 80 different countries). 
14 See, e.g., Gruenspecht, “Reasonable” Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for Information 
in the Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 543, 552 (2011) (citing In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993, 846 F. Supp. 11, 12-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)); 
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 550 
(2005) (acknowledging the usefulness of treating a computer like a container). 
15 Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants and the Power of Magistrate 
Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 8 (2011). 
16 Id. 
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meanings and definitions.17  It has infiltrated the vernacular and has been 
debased in marketing and media.  It would be an oversimplification to say 
that cloud computing refers to anything “in general” other than it is not the 
computing device in your physical possession.18  The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) provides an often-cited definition of 
cloud computing that is evolving and non-trivial.  A portion of that 
definition is as follows: 
 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction.  This cloud model is 
composed of five essential characteristics, three service 
models, and four deployment models.19 
 
 [8] Ultimately, cloud computing is a waypoint in decades of 
technology evolution.  Starting with single-user standalone computers and 
multi-user mainframes, cloud computing’s most direct ancestors were 
utility and grid computing.20 
                                                
17 See Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, NAT’L INST. 
OF STANDARDS & TECH., 2 (Sept. 2011), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
145/SP800-145.pdf.  See generally Nicole Galli & Edward Gecovich, Cloud Computing 
and the Doctrine of Joint Infringement: ‘Current Impact’ and Future Possibilities, 11 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. LAW 673, 676 (2012).  
18 Michael Armbrust et al., Above the Clouds: A Berkley View of Cloud Computing, UC 
BERKELEY RELIABLE ADAPTIVE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS LAB, 4 (Feb. 10, 2009), 
http://inst.cs.berkeley.edu/~cs10/fa10/lec/20/2010-11-10-CS10-L20-AF-Cloud-
Computing.pdf. 
19 See Mell & Grance, supra note 17.  This living document has already gone through 
more than 15 versions. See Evelyn Brown, Final Version of NIST Cloud Computing 
Definition Published, NIST (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/cloud-
102511.cfm. 
20 See Sourya Biswas, Cloud Computing vs Utility Computing vs Grid Computing: 
Sorting the Differences, CLOUDTWEAKS (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:44 AM), 
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[9] First, it is important to distinguish between cloud services and 
cloud computing.  Facebook and Gmail are remote cloud services, but 
they are not cloud computing. 21   Examples of cloud computing are 
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), Microsoft Azure, and Rackspace 
web hosting.22  “Cloud” is a generic term that refers to a network where 
the physical location and inner workings are abstracted away and 
unimportant to the usage.23  The Internet is one type of cloud.24  For 
example, to use Gmail, one need not know the physical location of 
Gmail’s servers.  Cloud computing also takes advantage of this definition 
of a cloud, as it is also a service connected to a network, often the 
Internet.25  But cloud computing offers customers additional functionality 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.cloudtweaks.com/2011/02/cloud-computing-vs-utility-computing-vs-grid-
computing-sorting-the-differences/. 
21 Some authors have mistakenly tied online services to cloud computing.  See, e.g., Marc 
Aaron Melzer, Copyright Enforcement in the Cloud, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 403, 405 (2011) (“To illustrate this point . . . three sites that can readily be 
considered examples of SaaS cloud computing: Facebook, the social networking site and 
number one website by traffic; Yahoo! Mail, the number one webmail provider by 
accounts; and YouTube, a video sharing site . . . .”).  Facebook, Yahoo! Mail, and 
YouTube do not meet the NIST definition.  See Mell & Grance, supra note 17.  Further, 
they are supported by advertising, not billed to the customer based on their usage. 
22 See Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, 
http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2012); Cloud Services on Windows 
Azure, WINDOWS AZURE, http://www.windowsazure.com/en-us/home/scenarios/cloud-
services/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2012); Open Public, Private, and Hybrid Clouds, 
RACKSPACE, http://www.rackspace.com/cloud/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2012).  
23 Mell & Grance, supra note 17.  
24 Cloud was first used to describe telecommunication networks, where the customer was 
blissfully unaware of the inner workings of how their telephone conversation was 
transmitted to the remote end.  The term was later used to describe computer networks, 
and ultimately to describe the Internet specifically.  See Antonio Regalado, Who Coined 
‘Cloud Computing’?, TECH. REV. (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/business/38987/.  
25 See Mell & Grance, supra note 17, at 3.  Cloud computing by definition exposes 
resources over a network—Public clouds offer these services over the Internet; Private 
clouds offer services on a private network; such as a private, internal company network; 
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in the form of raw remote computing resources, such as processing power 
or data storage, and the ability to provision26 those resources themselves.27  
 
[9] Cloud computing as a utility is actually, though not explicitly, 
broken down into two forms of service: data-intensive cloud computing 
(breaking up large computer jobs into smaller subtasks, computing each 
piece on a different computer)28 and utility cloud computing (more generic 
computing resources, such as hard drives and CPUs, which are exposed to 
customers as a utility).29  Cloud computing is further broken down into 
three service models: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (“IaaS”), Platform-as-a-
Service (“PaaS”), and Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”).30  Each model 
represents a different degree of separation between how much 
infrastructure the customer controls and how much the provider controls.31  
Infrastructure-as-a-Service is the model over which the customer has the 
                                                                                                                     
Hybrid clouds link the Internet’s public resources with an organization’s private 
resources.  See id.  
26 “Provisioning” of cloud resources refers to the act of requesting, purchasing, and 
acquiring the resource so that it is ready for use.  This process is often done by filling out 
a simple form on a management webpage.  After the request is received, the storage or 
computation services can be available to users in as little as a few seconds.  See, e.g., 
Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/ebs/ 
(last visited Aug. 7, 2012). 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Dan Sullivan, Why Hadoop is the A-list of Big Data, TOM’S IT PRO (June 8, 
2012, 10:17 AM), http://www.tomsitpro.com/articles/hadoop-mapreduce-
open_source_software-programming_model-data_management,2-306.html (explaining 
the software framework behind MapReduce and Hadoop, the technology behind 
Google’s search algorithms, which is illustrative of data-intensive cloud computing). 
29 See Sultanulla & Zheng Xuefeng, Cloud Computing: A Prologue, INT'L J. OF 
ADVANCED RES. IN COMPUTER AND COMM. ENGINEERING, Mar. 2012, at 3- 4, available 
at http://www.ijarcce.com/upload/march/Cloud%20Computing%20A%20Prologue.pdf 
(explaining the framework of Microsoft Azure and Amazon EC2 operating systems, 
which is illustrative of utility cloud computing).   
30 See Mell & Grance, supra note 17, at 2-3. 
31 See Melzer, supra note 21, at 409-11. 
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most control. 32   For example, when the cloud service is computing 
resources, the customer has super-user privileges over an entire operating 
system inside of a virtual machine.33  The provider owns and controls the 
rest of the infrastructure, from the hypervisor down to the data center’s 
physical concrete.34  The two other service models, Platform-as-a-Service 
and Software-as-a-Service, put more control and responsibility with the 
provider.35  Unlike Gmail or Facebook, which provide users with specific 
services, cloud computing is a canvas that programmers can use to create 
any service they choose.36  This article limits discussion to public clouds 
rather than private clouds on a company’s premises.  Few have analyzed 
the thorny legal issues that arise in electronic discovery of utility cloud 
computing, which is a topic that Part III explores in more detail. 
 
[10] Four of cloud computing’s defining characteristics are particularly 
important to legal analysis: (1) on-demand self-service; (2) rapid 
elasticity; (3) location independence; and (4) data replication.37  First, 
within the limits defined by the cloud provider, the customer has complete 
control over the provisioning and de-provisioning of cloud resources, 
                                                
32 See John Soma et al., Chasing the Clouds without Getting Drenched: A Call for Fair 
Practices in Cloud Computing Services, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 193, 198-99 (2011) ("In 
an IaaS Service Model, the user essentially has complete control and responsibility 
regarding which applications will be deployed in the cloud.").  See generally Bill Loeffler 
et al., What is Infrastructure as a Service, TECHNET (Sept. 13, 2011, 7:07 AM), 
http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/4633.what-is-infrastructure-as-
a-service.aspx (illustrating and comparing the different types of cloud service models).  
33 See Loeffler et al., supra note 32. 
34 See Paul Rudo, The Difference Between IaaS, SaaS, and Paas, ENTERPRISE FEATURES 
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://enterprisefeatures.com/2011/07/the-difference-between-iaas-saas-
and-paas/. 
35 See id. 
36 See generally Geva Perry, How Cloud & Utility Computing are Different, GIGAOM 
(Feb. 28, 2008, 4:42 PM), http://gigaom.com/2008/02/28/how-cloud-utility-computing-
are-different/. 
37 See Mell & Grance, supra note 17, at 2. 
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which they can do quickly and on-demand.38  Second, because of this ease 
and elasticity, customers can cause evidence to appear and disappear at a 
moment’s notice.39  Third, like other resources on the Internet, the cloud 
resource’s physical location has no bearing on the use or provisioning of 
those resources, which could exist in one or more data centers around the 
world.40  Finally, to provide data reliability and fault-tolerance, cloud 
providers routinely replicate data on several computers in multiple 
physical locations.41  Further, cloud environments typically store data in a 
distributed file system, breaking single files into pieces that can be stored 
on multiple independent storage devices, such as hard drives.42 
                                                
38 See Yung Chou, Cloud Computing for IT Pros, Part I: What is Service, TECHNET 
BLOGS (Dec. 15, 2010, 4:06 PM), 
http://blogs.technet.com/b/yungchou/archive/2010/12/15/cloud-computing-concepts-for-
it-pros-1-3.aspx. 
39 See generally Alberto G. Araiza, Electronic Discovery in the Cloud, 2011 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 8, 35 (2011) (discussing the increased legal risks of deleting ESI under the 
cloud).  But see SIMSON GARFINKEL ET AL., PRACTICAL UNIX AND INTERNET SECURITY 
675 (3d ed. 2003) (suggesting that the deletion of data is not permanent). 
40 See Perry, supra note 36 ("Although it is difficult to come up with a precise and 
comprehensive definition of cloud computing, at the heart of it is the idea that 
applications run somewhere on the ‘cloud’ (whether an internal corporate network or the 
public Internet) – we don’t know or care where."). 
41 See, e.g., AMAZON WEB SERVICES, AMAZON WEB SERVICES: OVERVIEW OF SECURITY 
PROCESSES 7 (May 2011), 
http://d36cz9buwru1tt.cloudfront.net/pdf/AWS_Security_Whitepaper.pdf (“Data stored 
in Amazon S3, Amazon SimpleDB, or Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) is redundantly 
stored in multiple physical locations as a part of normal operation of those services and at 
no additional charge.”); Jeffrey Richter, Understanding Cloud Storage, WINDOWS 
AZURE, http://www.windowsazure.com/en-us/develop/net/fundamentals/cloud-storage/ 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2012) ("In order to achieve highly available and scalable 
applications, Windows Azure offers multitenant storage machines within the various 
Windows Azure data centers.  These machines replicate your data ensuring that if one 
replica fails, others are still viable."). 
42 See generally Sean Gallagher, The Great Disk Drive in the Sky: How Web Giants Store 
Big—and we mean big—Data, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 26, 2012, 9:00 PM EST), 
http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/01/the-big-disk-drive-in-the-sky-how-the-giants-of-
the-web-store-big-data/ (explaining how Google, Microsoft, and Amazon, have adopted 
distributed file systems and the architecture behind such storage systems).  
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[11] Under the Stored Communications Act, which governs service 
providers’ voluntary and compelled disclosure of electronic 
communications and records, cloud computing likely fits the definition of 
a “remote computing service” (“RCS”).43  When Congress enacted this 
legislation in 1986, it likely never contemplated anything akin to modern 
cloud computing.44  At that time, many businesses could not afford 
large-scale computation or storage, so data were stored by providers and 
accessed remotely. 45   Congressional discussion of remote computing 
services essentially described them as time-sharing services.46  Those 
                                                
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006) (“the term 'remote computing service' means the 
provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an 
electronic communications system”); see also William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at 
What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 1195, 1212-14 (2010) (examining cloud computing as a remote computing service 
under the Stored Communications Act). 
44 See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 n.15 (C.D. Cal. 
2010); Derek Constantine, Note, Cloud Computing: The Next Great Technological 
Innovation, the Death of Online Privacy, or Both?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 502 
(2012). 
45 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution , Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 19-20 (written testimony of Richard Salgado, Senior Counsel, Law 
Enforcement and Information Security, Google Inc.).  
46 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 23 (1986) (citing Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act: Hearing on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 78 (1986) (statement of 
P. Nugent, Chairperson, Committee on Computer Systems and Communications 
Privacy)).  Nugent’s examples of remote computing services were current for the day, 
including “the service customer’s sales people use terminals to electronically transmit 
sales order information from geographically dispersed locations to the service vendor’s 
computer center.”  Id; see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10 (1986) (describing RCS as 
“essentially a time-sharing arrangement”).  Contrasted from 25 years ago, today’s cloud 
computing environment is fundamentally different, offering more general computing 
services that customers can quickly and easily provision on demand.  The district court in 
Viacom International v. YouTube ruled that YouTube was a remote computing 
service.  253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 
F.R.D. 346, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that “the archive maintained by [the service 
provider] constitutes ‘computer storage,’ and that the company’s maintenance of this 
archive on behalf of the City is a ‘remote computing service’ as defined under the SCA”). 
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systems are distant relatives of today’s cloud-computing offerings.  By 
nature of their Internet connectivity and client-server model, cloud 
providers also provide an “electronic communication service” (“ECS”).47  
When selling raw infrastructure resources that include network bandwidth, 
providers broadly deliver the ability to send or receive any kind of Internet 
communication.48 
 
[12] Cloud-hosted computers can play the same roles in a case as other 
types of computers.49  In criminal cases, a cloud-hosted computer could 
involve or constitute contraband, evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities.50  
Similarly, cloud-hosted computers may contain rich troves of evidence in 
civil matters. 51   But despite conventional wisdom, seizing a cloud 
provider’s hardware in a criminal matter is often unfruitful.52  And in a 
                                                
47 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006) (defining “electronic communication service” as “any 
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications”).  A cloud provider is also likely an “electronic communications 
system,” defined as “any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectric 
facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer 
facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such 
communications.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (2006). 
48 Customers that set up services in the cloud may or may not also be an ECS, depending 
on whether or not they provide the ability to send communications to third parties.  See 
Becker v. Toca, No. 07–7202, 2008 WL 4443050, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2008). 
49 See State v. Bellar, 217 P.3d 1094, 1110 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (finding no distinction 
between data stored on a personal computer and data copied and stored on another 
medium in the context of privacy rights). 
50 See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment 
Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
2205, 2218-20 (2009). 
51 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. First Universal Lending, LLC, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 
1342 (S.D. Fla. 2011).   See generally Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery Meets the Cloud, 
N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2011, at 45-46 (discussing discovery and a litigator’s duties in the 
context of cloud computing). 
52 Unfortunately, the DOJ Search and Seizure Manual still recommends it.  DOJ 
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 70-71; see also Liquid Motors, Inc. v. Lynd, No. 3:09–cv-
0611–N (N.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2009) (order ruling that the FBI had reasonable cause to seize 
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civil matter, such a seizure is often unduly burdensome or logistically 
impossible.53  Cases should evolve to contemplate and address the nuances 
of cloud computing, whose normal operations involve breaking up files 
and storing them across many servers in many locations.54  In fact, as part 
of normal operations, cloud-based data can move easily and transparently 
to different servers or storage locations. 55   This is not a sufficient 
argument for a party to request every server on each of the cloud 
provider’s premises.  A forensic examiner analyzing conventional 
computer hardware has the benefit of being able to search for and 
sometimes recover lost or deleted data still resident on the disk. 56  
Although this may be possible with a copy of a virtual machine, it requires 
additional evidence for a storage service like Amazon’s Simple Storage 
Service (S3).57  For example, if the provider keeps logs of what files are 
                                                                                                                     
computer servers of a cloud-like provider, even though data from other innocent 
customers were co-mingled with the search warrant’s target). 
53 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A 
POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 17 (Barbara Rothstein et al. eds. 2007). 
54 Given cloud computing’s distributed nature, courts in such cases should move beyond 
the concept of a server as a singular document repository.  See, e.g., United States v. Hay, 
231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding seizure of entire computer as contraband in 
child pornography case); Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he 
computer equipment was more than merely a ‘container’ for the files; it was an 
instrumentality of the crime.”).  Unlike Davis, where the court observed that “the obvious 
difficulties attendant in separating the contents of electronic storage from the computer 
hardware during the course of a search,” cloud computing makes this separation natural 
and convenient.  111 F.3d at 1480. 
55 Jeff Boles, The Benefits of Cloud-based Storage, Part 2, INFOSTOR (Nov. 10, 2008), 
http://www.infostor.com/index/articles/InfoStor-Article-Tool-
Template/_saveArticle/articles/infostor/backup-and_recovery/cloud-storage/the-
benefits_of_cloud-based.html. 
56 See, e.g., United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006); Hay, 231 F.3d 
at 635-36; United States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (M.D. Pa. 2008); see also 
DOJ MANUAL, supra note 2, at 69. 
57 In normal operations, the cloud fabric does this reassembly automatically. If the cloud 
provider is the criminal defendant or a civil party (not a third party)—or if there is doubt 
in the trustworthiness of the fabric—then the data’s veracity may be suspect.  
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deleted, who deleted them, and when were they deleted, that could be 
useful metadata, even if content proves unrecoverable.  
 
[13] In federal criminal cases, the decision of whether to seize hardware 
also weighs into the choice between a Rule 41 search warrant under the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and an Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”) warrant.58  While a Rule 41 warrant might be 
justified for seizing hardware and imaging hard drives on-site, courts have 
traditionally issued such warrants only for objects physically in the 
judicial district where the court is located.59  For ECPA warrants, the 
statute permits issuance from any court of “competent jurisdiction.”60  The 
Justice Department’s Search and Seizure Manual contains a sample ECPA 
warrant for e-mail hosted by an ISP61 as well as a sample Rule 41 warrant 
for removing computers from the premises.62  
 
[14] For civil cases, issuing a subpoena under Rule 45 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is a process similar to that under Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Rule 45 permits subpoena service in 
three instances: (1) within the issuing court’s district; (2) “within 100 
miles of the place specified for the . . . trial, production, or inspection;” or 
(3) within the state of the trial, production, or inspection.63  State courts 
have a limited geographic jurisdiction within their state’s borders, so a 
party cannot enforce extraterritorial subpoenas. 64  As such, a civil party 
seeking an out-of-state subpoena may choose to initiate an action in a 
court in the jurisdiction where the hardware is located.  
                                                
58 See United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1993); In re United States, 
665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (D. Or. 2009); DOJ MANUAL, supra note 2, at 112, 133-34. 
59 See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 2, at 84. 
60 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (a) (Supp. IV 2009). 
61 DOJ MANUAL, supra note 2, at 255-62. 
62 DOJ MANUAL, supra note 2, at 241-50. 
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2). 
64 See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 28 (2002) (“Service of a subpoena of a state court outside of 
the state where it issued is a nullity.”). 
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[15] But because cloud-computing data may be distributed throughout 
the country or around the world, determining the physical location of such 
a “production” or “inspection” raises several questions.  Is cloud-
computing data “produced” at the locations of dozens of servers around 
the world?  If a civil party seeks to “inspect” documents, rather than have 
them “produced,” that party historically would have traveled to a 
document repository, requiring subpoena service near that repository.65  
With cloud computing, however, does it matter that a requesting party 
could conceivably conduct such an “inspection” using a computer 
physically located anywhere in the world, including the venue 
jurisdiction?  Given these quandaries, subpoena service location may be 
unclear, but the most obvious service location is a cloud service provider’s 
headquarters or principle place of business.  
 
B. Digital Forensics for Cloud Computing 
  
[16] In today’s society, ESI is ubiquitous and plays a role in nearly 
every legal case.66  Digital forensics uses scientific and proven methods to 
analyze and interpret ESI to reconstruct events.67  The forensic examiner is 
tasked with analyzing ESI to reconstruct a timeline that describes, as best 
as possible, what happened and when.68  Although the forensic examiner 
                                                
65 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34; FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2). 
66 See Joseph A. Martin & Christine S. Baxter, A Practical Guide to Admitting ESI at 
Trial, 19 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION BUSINESS TORTS LITIGATION NEWSLETTER, no. 4, 
Summer 2012, at 2, available at 
http://www.archerlaw.com/files/articles/A%20Practical%20Guide%20to%20Admitting%
20ESI%20at%20Trial.pdf. 
67 See Brian Carrier, Defining Digital Forensic Examination and Analysis Tools, DIGITAL 
FORENSICS RESEARCH WORKSHOP, Aug. 2002, at 2, available at 
http://www.dfrws.org/2002/papers/Papers/Brian_carrier.pdf.  Many people use the term 
forensics in non-criminal contexts because no other term describes digital investigations 
in non-criminal situations, such as civil cases, intelligence gathering, and internal 
corporate investigations. 
68 See Ovie L. Carroll et al., Computer Forensics: Digital Forensic Analysis 
Methodology, 56 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, no. 1, Jan. 2008, at 4; 
Christopher Pogue, Sniper Forensics: GFIRST Edition, GOVERNMENT FORUM OF 
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could be asked to analyze single documents or e-mail messages, 69 
traditional forensics focuses on analyzing entire hard drives.70  Cloud 
computing injects new and non-trivial challenges to this task, including 
remotely located data, lack of control, layers of complexity, and 
authenticity.  Consider a hypothetical example71: 
 
Alice is a hacker who intends to exploit victims by placing a 
malicious webpage in the cloud.  She uses a vulnerability to 
exploit the cloud-hosted website of a legitimate company, Buzz 
Coffee.  After hacking into the server, she installs software that 
infects victims who browse the website.  Users complain to Buzz 
Coffee that they are being infected, so the company seeks to fix 
the problem and investigate the issue.  
 
[17] This realistic scenario illustrates some of the forensic task’s legal 
issues.  If Buzz Coffee owned, operated, and housed the server, then the 
technical and legal process of acquiring evidence would be routine.  Even 
if Buzz Coffee leased the server from a third party that housed it remotely, 
it would add very little complexity.  But because this scenario involves 
cloud computing, Buzz Coffee owns no hardware and it might have no 
idea where any of its data are stored.  As discussed in Part III, many 
conventional questions—such as those of jurisdiction, subpoenas, search 
warrant issuance and execution, and trustworthy evidence—take on 
unconventional complexity. 
 
[18] Amazon is unusually open and candid about its internal processes 
                                                                                                                     
INCIDENT RESPONSE AND SECURITY TEAMS, 34 (2011), http://www.us-
cert.gov/GFIRST/presentations/2011/Sniper_Forensics.pdf. 
69 See Carroll et al., supra note 68, at 3. 
70 See Tyler Newby & Ovie L. Carroll, Rethinking the Storage of Computer Evidence, 56 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, no. 1, Jan. 2008, at 60. 
71 Josiah Dykstra and Alan T. Sherman, Understanding Issues in Cloud Forensics: Two 
Hypothetical Case Studies, 3 J. NETWORK FORENSICS 1, (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript 
at 6), available at publications.csee.umbc.edu/publications/561/resources/590 (containing 
the original hypothetical example upon which this example is based). 
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and support for e-discovery in their cloud offerings known as Amazon 
Web Services (“AWS”).72  In one risk-management white paper, Amazon 
describes how it meets customers’ needs for electronic discovery, stating 
that “[c]ustomers are responsible for responding appropriately to legal 
procedures involving the identification, collection, processing, analysis, 
and production of electronic documents they store or process using AWS,” 
and “[u]pon request, AWS may work with customers who require AWS’ 
assistance in legal proceedings.”73  Unlike some cloud providers, Amazon 
does not explicitly offer services like forensics or incident response 
assistance.74  Rather, Amazon and other public cloud providers largely 
work with parties and law enforcement to the extent required by law.75 
 
III.  OBTAINING FORENSIC EVIDENCE FROM THE CLOUD 
 
[19] Numerous constitutional and statutory provisions govern searching 
and acquiring forensic evidence from cloud providers.  On the federal 
level, the analysis focuses on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Fourth Amendment.  In this 
section, we discuss how each applies to acquiring cloud-based ESI. 
 
                                                
72 See generally Amazon Web Services: Risk and Compliance, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, 
10 (July 2012), 
http://d36cz9buwru1tt.cloudfront.net/AWS_Risk_and_Compliance_Whitepaper.pdf 
(addressing whether AWS’s cloud services meet e-discovery procedures and 
requirements). 
73 Id. 
74 E.g., Terremark Worldwide, Investigative Response & Forensics, 
http://www.terremark.com/services/security-services/investigative-response.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2012) (advertising managed forensics and incident response, whereby 
the customer pays and the provider performs the work). 
75 See AWS Service Terms, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, 
https://aws.amazon.com/serviceterms/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (stating that Amazon 
removes content “pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or as required to 
comply with law or any judicial, regulatory or other governmental order or request”). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                   Volume XIX, Issue 1 
 
 18 
A.  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 
 
[20] Criminal and civil cases use similar analyses to determine which 
party is the proper discovery target.  Both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
34 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 permit a party to request 
data “in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.”76  For 
cloud computing, the “responding party” is usually the cloud provider (as 
with third-party subpoenas) or a cloud provider’s customer.77  But the 
question of who has “possession, custody, or control” is more complex.  
 
[21] For example, Dropbox is an online storage service that uses AWS 
for data storage. 78   Customers negotiate directly with Dropbox, not 
Amazon.79  If a Dropbox customer is sued or placed under criminal 
investigation, the opposing party could potentially request data from 
Dropbox, Amazon, or both.  As demonstrated below, the seeking party’s 
choice of target depends on what data are sought. 
 
[22] When a customer uploads data to the cloud, that customer also 
arguably transfers the data’s custody and possession to the cloud service 
provider—yet the customer may still retain “control.”80  Depending on the 
                                                
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(i). 
77 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d) (describing the steps 
required from a responding party). 
78 See Where does Dropbox store everyone’s data?, DROPBOX 
http://www.dropbox.com/help/7 (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (stating that “all files stored 
online by Dropbox are encrypted and kept securely on Amazon’s Simple Storage Service 
(S3) in multiple data centers located around the United States”). 
79 See generally id. (noting that Amazon owns Dropbox’s physical servers); DropBox is 
just a frontend to Amazon S3 with a killer sync feature, CLOUDIQUITY (Mar. 25, 2012, 
12:58 PM), http://www.cloudiquity.com/2012/03/dropbox-is-just-a-frontend-to-amazon-
s3-with-a-killer-sync-feature/ (noting that Dropbox employs a frontend sync feature that 
syncs files stored on Amazon’s S3 servers). 
80 AWS Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, at § 8.1, 
https://aws.amazon.com/agreement/ (last updated Mar. 15, 2012) (stating that “As 
between [AWS] and [content owner], [owner] or your licensors own all right, title, and 
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services provided and the parties’ contractual relationship, the cloud 
provider may well act as the customer’s agent.  Generally, to establish an 
agency relationship, the agent must generally be authorized to act for the 
principal, thereby binding the principal by the agent’s words or actions.81  
The issue of whether an agency relationship exists is largely fact-
dependent.82  More than for other types of cloud services (e.g., PaaS or 
SaaS), the agency relationship for parties to an IaaS contract appears 
clearer because the customer has additional control.83  For example, AWS 
customers can instruct the provider to execute automatic actions based on 
particular events.84  For instance, the customer can instruct AWS as 
follows: if a customer’s website becomes overwhelmed with too many 
                                                                                                                     
interest in and to Your Content . . . including any related intellectual property rights”); 
see also Security, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/teams/security (last visited Aug. 
15, 2012) (specifying that users gain “added control” over their data because Dropbox 
provides extra security and password protection). 
81 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “agency” as “[a] fiduciary 
relationship created by express or implied contract or by law, in which one party (the 
agent) may act on behalf of another party (the principal) and bind that other party by 
words or actions.”); HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF 
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 1, at 3 (2d ed. 1990); see also Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM 
Investor Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n determining whether an 
agency relationship exists, the question hinged on the principal's right to exercise control 
over the activities of the agent.” (citing Gunderson v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., No. 99-
4032, 2000 WL 1154423, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2000))); United States v. Bonds, 608 
F.3d 495, 505 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the Second Restatement’s ten factors, noting 
that the “’essential ingredient . . . is the extent of control exercised by the employer.’” 
(quoting NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008) (alteration in 
original)). 
82 See 2A C.J.S. AGENCY Generally § 7 (1972) (noting that determining if an agency 
relationship exists is a question of fact). 
83 See, e.g., Sample Technology Statements of Work (SOWs), U.S. GEN. SERVICES 
ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/133795 (last updated Aug. 22, 2012) 
(providing samples of IaaS contracts for many different aspects of cloud storage and data 
protection). 
84 See AWS Management Console, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, 
http://aws.amazon.com/console/#eb (last accessed Aug. 24, 2012) (describing the 
different cause and effect mechanisms available from AWS). 
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requests, then AWS should automatically start another virtual machine to 
assist with the load.85  This arrangement could be interpreted as one of 
express actual authority: the customer acts as principal and AWS acts as 
the customer’s agent.86  If AWS acts as an agent, the customer’s fiduciary, 
then the customer would also arguably have “control” over its cloud-
computing data.87  As such, the customer could be required to produce the 
cloud-computing data that it controls. 
 
[23] Where discovery requests and subpoenas are issued to cloud 
providers directly and without reference to whether the provider 
“controls” that data, those situations require a different analysis.  To 
discuss what data are in the cloud provider’s possession, custody, or 
control, one should first understand what data might be available.88  
Infrastructure-as-a-Service can be viewed as a multi-layered cake, with 
each layer independently comprising part of the cloud service.  The cake’s 
top layer contains the customer’s data and applications, which Internet 
users may utilize as a webpage or database.89  These data are the first that 
may be available and by definition of IaaS, the data are owned and 
controlled by the customer.90  The next layer is the guest virtual machine, 
                                                
85 See id. (describing the “Elastic Beanstalk” feature which “handles the details of 
capacity provisioning, load balancing, auto-scaling, and application health monitoring”). 
86 See FTC v. First Universal Lending, LLC, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1347-49 (S.D. Fla. 
2011) (discussing a party’s data on servers owned by cloud service Salesforce, which 
constituted the “backbone” of a party’s business). 
87 Compare AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 80 (describing customer control in 
AWS services), with C.J.S. AGENCY, supra note 82 (describing the agency relationship). 
88 The complete set of forensic data available to a requestor is categorically unknown.  
The public cloud providers have thus far withheld their capabilities, possibly because 
they are protecting the proprietary implementation that gives them competitive 
advantage.  We speculate about data that are likely available, but cannot speculate about 
the provider’s practical ability to collect these data. 
89 See Loeffler et al., supra note 32. 
90 See Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., www.gsa.gov/iaas 
(last updated July 5, 2012).  
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which in IaaS is also owned and controlled by the customer.91  The cake’s 
third layer is the hypervisor: special software that runs on a provider’s 
computer (the host), allowing many virtual machines to run independently 
on a single physical machine.92  Below the physical machine is the 
distributed array of storage disks.93  The cake’s base is the computer 
networking that interconnects the components, providing high bandwidth 
to the Internet.94 
  
[24] To date, the major cloud providers have not yet released their 
policies regarding their responses to civil or criminal requests, nor have 
they described the types of records and data that they will make 
available.95  But cloud providers do have data that could prove useful in 
criminal and civil matters.  For example, cloud providers maintain data 
related to subscriber information and billing records.96  Because customers 
are billed based on their usage, records relating to service usage should 
                                                
91 See Infrastructure as a Service, CDW, 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.edtechmagazine.com/higher/sites/edtechmagazine.com.higher/files/108289-
wp-inf_service_df.pdf; Information Supplement: PCI DSS Virtualization Guidelines, PCI 
SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, 23 (June 2011), 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Virtualization_InfoSupp_v2.pdf. 
92 Francoise Gilbert, Cloud Service Contracts May Be Fluffy: Selected Legal Issues to 
Consider Before Taking Off, 14 No. 6 J. INTERNET L. 1, Dec. 2010, at 17, 19; PCI 
SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 7. 
93 See Loeffler et al., supra note 32; PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 91, 
at 6.  
94 See Loeffler et al., supra note 32; PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 91, 
at 6.  
95 See Ashish S. Prasad, Cloud Computing and Social Media: Electronic Discovery 
Considerations and Best Practices, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Feb. 
2012, at 26, 27, available at: http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/17454/cloud-
computing-and-social-media-electronic-discovery-considerations-and-best-practic; cf., 
John Soma, et al., supra note 32, at 220-21. 
96 See Joshua S. Parker, Note, Lost in the Cloud: Protecting End-User Privacy in Federal 
Cloud Computing Contracts, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 385, 396-97 (2012).  
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also be available.97  Beyond these obvious requests, providers often keep 
other data for some time.  A provider uses connection information 
(sometimes called NetFlow records), to record an Internet 
communication’s two endpoints; this non-content data can be useful as a 
historical record.98  When a customer wishes to procure or manage cloud 
services, that customer typically visits a special website to manage those 
actions.99  That website and its underlying components may also be an 
attractive source of forensic evidence.  The provider might be able to 
produce logs showing successful and unsuccessful logins, the logins’ IP 
addresses and geographic origins, and their time and date.  If services can 
be provisioned programmatically, then similar logs may be available.  
 
[25] Although the cloud system’s operation may not require humans to 
know where data are located (e.g., server or data center), the underlying 
infrastructure must know that information.100  The provider may record 
system logs that describe where the data are; who created them; and when 
they were created, modified, or deleted.  In sum, no universal template 
currently exists for parties and law enforcement seeking cloud data; often, 
they do not know what they can or should ask for.  Moreover, the data that 
cloud service providers house can be as unique as the cloud service 
providers themselves. 
 
[26] Regarding IaaS, data inside a customer’s virtual machine (e.g., 
webpages) are hidden even from the provider unless the customer makes 
                                                
97 See id; see also Architecture for Managing Clouds, DISTRIBUTED MANAGEMENT TASK 
FORCE, 39 (June 18, 2010), 
http://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP-IS0102_1.0.0.pdf. 
98 See Jamie Epstein, Get in the Know, NetFlow is the Way to Go, TMCNET.COM (July 
30, 2012), http://netflow.tmcnet.com/articles/300888-get-the-know-netflow-the-way-
go.htm. 
99 See Loeffler et al., supra note 32. 
100 See DISTRIBUTED MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 97, at 26.  
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that data available. 101   The cloud provider, whose ownership and 
responsibility extend to the hypervisor and below, could access the 
computer files that make up the virtual machine and when responding to 
discovery, they could provide a copy of that virtual machine.102  Providers 
are also capable of collecting content and non-content forensic evidence in 
their possession, custody, and control.  For example, they could collect 
network packet captures of all ingress and egress network traffic from 
their cloud, they could collect logs showing the data’s physical storage 
locations, and they have billing data about the provisioning and usage of 
cloud resources.103 
 
[27] Providers’ contractual language with their customers will 
                                                
101 See Wely Lau, Comparing IAAS and PAAS: A Developer’s Perspective, 
ACLOUDYPLACE (Jan. 13, 2012), http://acloudyplace.com/2012/01/comparing-iaas-and-
paas-a-developers-perspective/. 
102 See Wayne Jansen & Timothy Grance, Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public 
Cloud Computing, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 12, 18 (Dec. 2011), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-144/SP800-144.pdf. 
103 See id. at 12, 20-21 (explaining that cloud service providers have access to a lot of 
information that the user does not have access to).  The Communications Assistance for 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA) requires telecommunications carriers to assist 
law enforcement in performing electronic surveillance pursuant to court orders.  47 
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006).  However, the term “telecommunications carrier” does not 
include “persons or entities insofar as they are engaged in providing information 
services.”  47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(C)(i).  The law does not require cloud providers to 
provide real-time interception capabilities.  In a statement before the House Judiciary 
Committee, the FBI and others identified this as a shortcoming.  See, e.g., Going Dark: 
Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 23-24 (2011) (statement of Susan Landau, Fellow at the Radcliffe 
Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University); FBI - Going Dark: Lawful 
Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/going-dark-lawful-
electronic-surveillance-in-the-face-of-new-technologies (posting the testimony of Valerie 
Caproni, General Counsel to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the 
Subcommittee on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security).  
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determine the extent to which those customers may access these data.104  
To complicate matters, providers possess some data over which their 
customers may not have access (e.g., infrastructure logs), as well as other 
data over which the providers may not have control (e.g., customer’s 
data).105 
 
[28] Preservation is an essential tool in electronic discovery, 
particularly with data that is highly volatile or elastic.106  For criminal 
matters, compelling a provider to preserve a snapshot of potential 
evidence requires a very low bar.107  For civil matters, the bar for 
obtaining forensic data is higher and more time-intensive, so civil parties 
who require such ephemeral data are wise to start the process of 
acquisition quickly.108 
 
[29] If they do not have one already, cloud providers should have some 
mechanism for preservation.  On one hand, providers have an advantage in 
preserving large data volumes since they advertise broad storage 
                                                
104 See, e.g., Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 354 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (the court 
ruled that text messages held by a provider were subject to the city’s control, given that 
the city had some contractual right of access to the data). 
105 See Jansen & Grance, supra note 102, at 20-21. 
106 Erik Harris, Note, Discovery of Portable Electronic Devices, 61 ALA. L. REV. 193, 
197, n.24 (2009); cf. Cameron G. Shilling, Electronic Discovery: Litigation Crashes into 
the Digital Age, 22 LAB. L., 207, 227 (2007). 
107 ECS and RCS providers “upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all 
necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the 
issuance of a court order or other process” for 90 days, which can be renewed for an 
additional 90 days.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2006).  Section 2704 describes how a 
governmental entity, in a subpoena or court order, may order the provider to create a 
backup copy of the contents of the communications.  18 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2006). 
108 See Shilling, supra note 106, at 214 (explaining that counsel should discuss E-
discovery issues early on in the litigation process); Justin P. Murphy, E-Discovery in 
Criminal Matters—Emerging Trends & The Influence of Civil Litigation Principles Post-
Indictment E-Discovery Jurisprudence, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 257, 259, 262-64 (2010) 
(pointing out that electronic discovery for criminal matters do not have to follow the 
much more strict discovery requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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resources. 109   Additionally, IaaS resources such as virtual machines 
inherently permit providers to take snapshots of the running machines at 
any time.110  On the other hand, providers may not be able to prevent their 
customers from de-provisioning resources or deleting data.  Consider the 
following example, where current cloud practices could inhibit 
preservation:  
 
Cloud resources, such as virtual machines, are launched using a 
user’s private key.  A hacker steals a key from a legitimate user, 
launches hundreds of machines that flood a popular website, and 
takes it offline.  The opposing party may request data from the 
legitimate user, seeking activity logs to show who launched the 
machines, as well as copies of the machines themselves.  But the 
legitimate user may have no logs to produce and the attacker may 
have tried to cover its tracks by deleting the hundreds of 
malicious machines.  
 
In traditional digital forensics, investigators would create a mirror image 
of a hard drive that the examiner can then search for deleted files.111  
Tragically, although cloud providers likely know when files in their 
storage array are deleted and although they may have logs to prove it, they 
probably lack the ability to recover deleted files or to produce complete 
hard disk images.112 
                                                
109 Cf. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling 
that the need for 12 terabytes of data outweighed the expense and burden of production). 
110 See Shathabheesha, Virtualization Security in Cloud Computing, INFOSEC INSTITUTE 
(June 21, 2012), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/virtualization-security-cloud-
computing/ (explaining that anyone with access to the host disk files on a virtual machine 
can create a snapshot).  
111 See Franz J. Vancura, Using Computer Forensics to Enhance the Discovery of 
Electronically Stored Information, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 727, 728-29 (2010).  
112 Microsoft Azure’s service level agreement reads “You’re responsible for backing up 
the data that you store on the service . . . . Data that is deleted may be irretrievable.” 
Microsoft Services Agreement, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
US/windows-live/microsoft-service-agreement (last visited Aug. 27, 2012). 
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[30] Because cloud computing is so elastic, its corresponding data are 
often ephemeral.113  While some courts have noted that ephemeral data 
“are not discoverable in most cases,”114 some courts have held that in 
certain cases, ephemeral data, such as random access memory (RAM) 
data, are discoverable. 115   At least one court has affirmed the 
discoverability of IP addresses.116   In the cloud, both RAM and IP 
addresses are potentially fleeting and quickly inaccessible.117  Although a 
civil party must preserve evidence when it reasonably anticipates 
litigation,118 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also relieve parties of 
the duty to preserve if the data are “lost as a result of the routine, good-
faith operation of an electronic information system.”119  At a minimum, 
cloud providers are more likely to retain data about when resources are 
                                                
113 See Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud Getting Started Guide, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, 
5 (Mar. 11, 2008), http://ec2dream.webs.com/AWS-Management-Console.pdf.  
114 H. JAMES F. HOLDERMAN ET AL., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT 
PROGRAM 14 (2009), available at http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/Statement%20-
%20Phase%20One.pdf (listing categories of data “not discoverable in most cases,” 
including hard drives’ “deleted” or “unallocated” data, RAM, “ephemeral data,” 
temporary files, cache frequently updated metadata, duplicative backup data, and other 
ESI requiring “extraordinary affirmative measures”); see also Phillips v. Netblue, Inc., 
No. C-05-4401 SC, 2007 WL 174459, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2007) (holding a 
party’s argument that hyperlinks should have been preserved was absurd). 
115 E.g., Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Victor 
Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 524 (D. Md. 2010) (“[t]he general 
duty to preserve may also include deleted data, data in slack spaces, backup tapes, legacy 
systems, and metadata”); Tener v. Cremer, 931 N.Y.S.2d 552, 555-57 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2011) (remanding for determination of several questions, including the data’s current 
availability, custodians, and cost for retrieval). 
116 See Columbia Pictures, 245 F.R.D. at 451.  
117 See generally Conrad J. Jacoby, E-Discovery Update - Discovery of Ephemeral 
Digital Information, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 
(Jul. 27, 2007), http://www.llrx.com/columns/fios19.htm (explaining how RAM is 
constantly rewritten and therefore a fleeting storage space).  
118 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
119 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
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provisioned and de-provisioned since those activities directly determine a 
customer’s bill.120  
 
[31] Contracts between the cloud provider and customers often detail 
such issues of ownership.121  Clear contractual provisions can help to 
avoid later litigation and expense.  Where contracts do not sufficiently 
discuss ownership, however, parties must look to case law.  For example, 
the court in Flagg v. City of Detroit found that the city had a contractual 
right to text messages held by a third party provider.122  The Flagg court 
did not address the ownership of other data, such as the provider’s logs.123  
For discovery requests, subpoenas, or search warrants, any requesting 
party would be wise to determine what data is in what party’s possession 
or custody, whether the provider, the customer, or both. 
 
                                                
120 See generally Matthew Wachs et al., Exertion-based billing for cloud storage access, 
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE 3RD USENIX WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
(HOT CLOUD ’11), (June 14-15, 2011), available at http://www.pdl.cmu.edu/PDL-
FTP/CloudComputing/hotcloud11-final62.pdf (discussing the different rates for charging 
cloud customers depending on their amount or usage). 
121 Amazon Web Services has such an agreement.  See AWS Customer Agreement, supra 
note 80.  This contract defines “content” as “software (including machine images), data, 
text, audio, video, images or other content.”  See id. at § 14.  In Section 8.1, Amazon 
clams “no rights under this Agreement from you or your licensors to Your Content, 
including any related intellectual property rights.”  Id. at § 8.1.  The document defines 
“Service Offerings” as “the Services (including associated APIs), the AWS Content, the 
AWS Marks, the AWS Site, and any other product or service provided by us under this 
Agreement.”  Id. at § 14.  In Section 8.4, Amazon clams that “we or our affiliates or 
licensors and reserve all right, title, and interest in and to the Service Offerings.”  Id. at § 
8.4.  In other words, the customer explicitly owns their virtual machines, and does not 
own the IP address, hardware, or cloud-hosting infrastructure.  Microsoft contracts 
contain similar language.  See Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 112 (“Except for 
material that we license to you, we don’t claim ownership of the content you provide on 
the service.  Your content remains your content.”).  But unlike Amazon’s agreement, 
Microsoft’s Service Agreement does not define “content.”  See id. 
122 252 F.R.D. 346, 354 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
123 See generally id. (discussing the discoverability of text messages). 
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[32] Determining jurisdiction in cloud-computing environments is 
unlike any prior jurisdiction analysis.  Even more than websites, cloud 
computing is neither jurisdictional nor multi-jurisdictional.  It is non-
jurisdictional in that physical geography frequently does not matter.  Even 
for existing cases discussing online data, those cases almost exclusively 
revolve around websites.124  Although online services such as Facebook 
and Gmail frequently comply with discovery requests, those cases rarely, 
if ever, discuss the nature of the services’ back-end geographic location 
and the locations of the resultant data. 125   In the cloud, the issue 
compounds since data are likely stored in several jurisdictions and 
possibly even across international borders among countries with 
conflicting laws.  For example, in one criminal case, the defendant was 
tried in California because she was accused of violating a social 
networking site’s terms of service and the site’s owner was located in 
California.126  Courts frequently apply the “effects test” for personal 
jurisdiction, which is based on “(1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed 
at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered—and 
which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered—in the forum state.”127  
Under this framework, one would expect most cloud-based litigation to 
occur in the cloud customer’s forum state.128  The effects test assumes that 
most often, the crimes, infringements, or torts are committed against the 
data owners in their forum state without any intent to cause harm in the 
forum state of the data.129 
                                                
124 See, e.g., Facebook v. Connectu LLC, No. C 07-01389 RS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
61962 *10-22 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (discussing jurisdiction as relates to the 
Plaintiff’s website).  
125 See, e.g., id. at *14-15. 
126 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
127 Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). 
128 See generally Facebook, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *14-15 (explaining how 
jurisdiction has typically been evaluated by the courts regarding the effects test). 
129 See, e.g., Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
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[33] For crimes involving cloud computing, following Rule 18—that 
“the government must prosecute an offense in the district where the 
offense was committed”130—is not straightforward.  Where the object of 
the crime is the cloud, a criminal case could potentially be tried in one of 
four venues: that of the perpetrator, the cloud provider, the cloud 
customer, or the online data location.  Cloud service providers may dictate 
the venue in their contract, but that may not be binding criminally.131  
Barring a contractually chosen venue, 18 U.S.C. § 3237 allows for 
criminal offenses committed in one district to “be inquired of and 
prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or 
completed.”132  Courts have described the determination of a proper venue 
“as a substantial contacts rule that takes into account a number of 
factors—the site of the defendant’s acts, the elements and nature of the 
crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of 
each district for accurate fact finding.”133  In cloud-based crimes, none of 
these factors creates an obvious choice.  Any of those four locations could 
arguably be a proper venue. 
  
[34] Cloud computing and most other web services exist without 
deference to geographical location. 134   Customers generally have a 
reasonable expectation of location for their data; they generally believe 
that if they are using a service provided by a U.S. company, then their data 
                                                
130 FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. 
131 See, e.g., Cisco Connect Cloud Terms of Service, CISCOCONNECTCLOUD, 
http://ciscoconnectcloud.com/ui/ustatic/termsofservice/1.0.0/termsofservice-en-US.html 
(last visited August 19, 2012) (providing an example of a contract in which the provider 
dictates choice of venue).  
132 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (2006). 
133 United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States 
v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
134 See generally Mell & Grance, supra note 17, at 2 (describing the location 
independence of resources as an essential characteristic of cloud computing). 
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reside in the United States.135  Looking at their providers’ top-level 
domain names, users may assume that data stored by “www.state.md.us” 
is located in the United States, while data stored by “mail.ru” is located in 
Russia. 136  Most service-level agreements for online services do not 
specify the location where data will be stored.137  Absent any reason to 
believe otherwise,138  customers and end-users will make assumptions 
about the data’s location, as well as the laws governing it. 
 
[35] In criminal cases, several vehicles can compel data from a 
provider.  As with any other data, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 offers prosecutors five 
mechanisms to obtain certain information from a provider: (1) Subpoena; 
(2) Subpoena with prior notice to the subscriber or customer; 
(3) § 2703(d) court order; (4) § 2703(d) court order with prior notice to the 
subscriber or customer; and (5) Search warrant. 139 
 
[36] The Department of Justice prefers using “a subpoena or other less 
intrusive means to obtain evidence from disinterested third parties, unless 
use of those less intrusive means would substantially jeopardize the 
availability or usefulness of the materials sought.” 140   Losing the 
availability of data is of paramount concern given the cloud’s elasticity.  
Regardless of the vehicle used, some data may be in the provider’s 
                                                
135 See Joseph A. Schoorl, Note, Clicking the “Export” Button: Cloud Data Storage and 
U.S. Dual-Use Export Controls, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 648 (2012) (stating that 
cloud users are generally unaware that their data are transferred across national borders). 
136 The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) assigns top-level domain names 
based on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 3166–1 alpha-2 
country codes.  The United States is assigned .us and Russia is assigned .ru.  See ICP-1: 
Internet Domain Name System Structure and Delegation (ccTLD Administration and 
Delegation), ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/icp/icp-1.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
137 See, e.g., CISCOCLOUDCONNECT, supra note 131. 
138 Amazon Web Services, for example, allows customers to specify the geographic 
region where data is stored.  See AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 80. 
139 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(d) (2006). 
140 See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 3, at 111. 
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possession, custody, or control, whereas other data may be in the cloud 
customer’s possession, custody, or control.  To further complicate matters, 
the Stored Communications Act has been interpreted to prohibit a provider 
from disclosing user content in response to a civil subpoena.141  This 
decision provides drastically different protections for data storage in an 
ECS versus a provider of RCS, where 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) allows a cloud 
provider, acting as a provider of RCS, to disclose the contents of an 
account used for remote storage without a warrant and without notifying 
the customer or subscriber.142  One scholar, Orin S. Kerr, has suggested 
that this disparate treatment is unconstitutional.143 
 
[37] Another issue to consider is time.  Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure does not specify a minimum time period within which a 
responding party must comply with a subpoena.144  Typically, the issuing 
party will permit the responding party to comply in ten to thirty days, 
except where the issuing court’s local rules dictate another minimum 
period for compliance.145  Given the ease with which cloud data can be 
either be overwritten or destroyed, as well as providers’ lack of evidence 
preservation mechanisms, the threat of spoliation dramatically 
                                                
141 See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 350 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“[The Stored 
Communications Act] lacks any language that explicitly authorizes a service provider to 
divulge the contents of a communication pursuant to subpoena or court order.”). 
142 See 18 U.S.C § 2703(b) (2006). 
143 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1029 (2010). 
144 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (discussing the form in which documents must be 
produced).  Courts, however, “may specify conditions for the discovery.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
45(d)(1)(D). 
145 See David J. Lender et al., Federal Practice: Responding to a Subpoena, PRACTICAL 
LAW COMPANY, 7 (2010), available at http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/925ba5e1-
3ebb-4758-8e83-a1424fdff940/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e8247337-b86d-
4df9-b01b-a953f20b0545/10.18.10-
Federal%20Practice%20Responding%20To%20A%20Subpoena%20(1-503-
1741)%20(2)%20(2).pdf.  
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increases.146  One solution is to require faster subpoena compliance.147  
But the difficulties with this approach are that it would require human 
intervention at the cloud provider and it does not scale.148  Another 
solution is empowering data owners and investigators to gather forensic 
evidence themselves.149  This option would shift the burden from the 
provider (who lacks monetary or legal incentive to quickly comply) to the 
parties themselves (who have every incentive to collect evidence quickly 
and inexpensively).  
 
B.  Fourth Amendment 
 
[38] Search and seizure of evidence regarding crimes committed in or 
against the cloud should be valid under the Fourth Amendment.150  This 
                                                
146 See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Cloud 
Computing (Draft) 28-31 (The Sedona Conf. Working Paper Grp. 1, 2011). 
147 But see Erin E. Rhinehart, Civil Subpoenas in Federal Court: Complying with Third-
Party Subpoenas, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2012), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/pretrial/articles/0923_civil-subpoenas-
2.html (discussing what is considered a “‘reasonable time to comply’” under the current 
version of Rule 45).  The Rule 45 “reasonable time” requirement may prove antagonist to 
the goal of faster subpoena compliance. 
148 See Meera Unnithan Sossamon, Subpoenas And Social Networks: Fixing The Stored 
Communications Act In A Civil Litigation Context, 57 LOY. L. REV. 619, 642-43 
(highlighting the unreasonably high costs and expenses associated with cloud computing 
providers’ subpoena compliance); see also Steven S. Gensler, The Intersection of 
Facebook and the Law: Symposium Article: Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 
65 ARK. L. REV. 7, 35 (2012) (addressing a discussion held by the Discovery 
Subcommittee over whether a “detailed rule” regarding “when the duty to preserve is 
triggered and what must be preserved” is necessary, or whether that rule would be too 
limiting given rapid developments in technology). 
149 This area is being actively explored by one of this article’s authors. 
150 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”); see also David J. Goldstone & Daniel B. Reagan, Practice Tips: 
Social Networking, Mobile Devices, and the Cloud: The Newest Frontiers of Privacy 
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topic has become a focal point of discussion over recent years; scholars 
have carefully looked at the interplay between privacy and cloud 
computing.151 
   
[39] For simplicity, we will assume that cloud-computing customers 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy for their data.152  We also 
proceed under the current case law applying the Fourth Amendment to 
online data.153  Therefore, under Katz v. United States and its progeny, 
obtaining cloud data constitutes a search and violating the reasonable 
expectation to privacy implicates the Fourth Amendment. 154   More 
difficult are the issues surrounding warrant execution for cloud data.155 
 
[40] Warrants for web-based e-mail can specify particular senders, 
recipients, and timeframes, thereby preventing the unnecessary production 
of the entire e-mail corpus.156  In IaaS, the warrant may similarly narrow 
                                                                                                                     
Law, 55 B.B.J. 17, 20-21 (2011) (noting that the “court held that [the defendant] had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails stored by the ISP, finding that emails are 
subject to the same Fourth Amendment protections as letters and phone calls” (citing 
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010))). 
151 See, e.g., Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Evolutionary Study of Cloud Computing 
Services Privacy Terms, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 593, 594-98 (2010); 
David S. Barnhill, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon 
v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 638, 642-47 (2010). 
152 See Couillard, supra note 50, at 2205-06 (“[U]sers expect their information to be 
treated the same on this virtual cloud as it would be if it were stored on their computer, 
phone, or iPod.”). 
153 See R. Bruce Wells, The Fog of Cloud Computing: Fourth Amendment Issues Raised 
by the Blurring of Online and Offline Content, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 225-29 (2009) 
(featuring a proposal to protect online data under an entirely new doctrine); see also 
Couillard, supra note 50, at 2205.  
154 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Wells, supra note 153, at 226-27. 
155 See generally Barnhill, supra note 151 (discussing reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the workplace and in data migrating to the cloud). 
156 But see Constantine, supra note 44, at 518-520 (discussing the dilemma of 
determining whether a part of the e-mail should be considered “content” or “non-
content”, and the implications for a search warrant based on this distinction).  
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the search for data by filename, creation time, or author.157  Recently Kerr 
criticized the ex ante regulation of computer search and seizure. 158  
Despite the potential for an unprecedented and overwhelming volume of 
ESI from cloud crimes, search warrants in these cases have a unique 
opportunity to address the particularity issue often associated with digital 
searches.  Unfortunately, because cloud providers are often opaque about 
their infrastructure, it would be impossible or unwise for the warrant to 
specify the search strategy or approach of execution.159  With a basic 
understanding of cloud-computing technology, courts should decline to 
impose limits as conditions on issuing cloud-targeted warrants. 
  
[41] Today, most search warrants for online data are served upon 
providers, who subsequently execute them. 160   The provider’s legal 
                                                
157 See, e.g., Marlo Arredondo Aff. for Search Warrant 2, Aug. 7, 2008.  But see Kerr, 
supra note 14, at 543-48 (discussing the ability for users to alter these characteristics, 
making certain data nearly impossible to find).  Given the nature of digital evidence, this 
does not overcome the need to scan the container for the evidence.  Just as one would leaf 
through a filing cabinet looking for a particular document, so too must the investigator 
scour the computer looking for the particular file.  Unfortunately, distributed cloud data 
may require the leafing through many filing cabinets in many warehouses in many 
locations, where data is co-mingled with other users’ data.  Id. at 576-77 (including a 
discussion on the plain view doctrine).  
158 Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1241, 1246 (2010) (“[Arguing] that ex ante regulation of computer warrants is both 
constitutionally unauthorized and unwise.”). 
159 See Constantine, supra note 44, at 501 (“Considering the expansive nature of the 
terms of Google's general service agreement and assuming consumers actually read the 
agreement rather than blindly clicking ‘agree,’ users may wonder what level of privacy 
their files will have if uploaded or sent through one of Google's services.”); see also Ari 
Schwartz et al., Storing Our Lives Online: Expanded Email Storage Raises Complex 
Policy Issues, 1 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 597, 597 (2005) (“[I]t is sometimes hard to 
determine what a specific provider's policy is, especially with respect to deletion of mail 
from inactive accounts or deletion of older mail from active accounts.”).  But see Kerr, 
supra note 14, at 565 (“The Framers of the Fourth Amendment included a particularity 
requirement to disallow general searches: all warrants must describe ex ante the particular 
place to be searched and the particular person or thing to be seized.”). 
160 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Winston Maxwell & 
Christopher Wolf, A Global Reality: Government Access to Data in the Cloud, HOGAN 
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authority to execute a warrant comes from both statutory and case law.161  
The practical reason is also germane: law enforcement officers have 
neither the resources nor expertise to execute warrants surrounding cloud 
computing.162  This is consistent even with traditional search warrants.  
When officers go to an office building looking for evidence, they do not 
ask the occupants to locate that evidence.  They know what they are 
looking for, so it is more efficient for them to do the search, rather than 
relying on the occupant who lacks incentive to be thorough.  For cloud 
computing, however, when the cloud provider executes the warrant at the 
bequest of law enforcement, it may become the government’s agent.163  
                                                                                                                     
LOVELLS, 4 (May 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/News/c6edc1e2-d57b-402e-9cab-
a7be4e004c59/Presentation/NewsAttachment/a17af284-7d04-4008-b557-
5888433b292d/Revised%20Government%20Access%20to%20Cloud%20Data%20Paper
%20(18%20July%2012).pdf (last updated July 18, 2012).  
161 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006) (“A search warrant may in all cases be served by 
any of the officers mentioned in its direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve 
such warrant, but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he 
being present and acting in its execution.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) (2006) 
(“Notwithstanding section 3105 of this title, the presence of an officer shall not be 
required for service or execution of a search warrant issued in accordance with this 
chapter requiring disclosure by a provider of electronic communications service or 
remote computing service of the contents of communications or records or other 
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service.”); United States v. 
Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The Fourth Amendment does not 
explicitly require official presence during a warrant’s execution, therefore it is not an 
automatic violation if no officer is present during a search.”). 
162 See Couillard, supra note 50, at 2217. 
163 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 953 (1982); People v. McKinnon, 500 
P.2d 1097, 1106 (Cal. 1972); People v. Scott, 117 Cal. Rptr. 925, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1974).  In United States v. Richardson, the Fourth Circuit has held that AOL was not 
acting as an agent for the government when it uncovered and reported child pornography 
in a customer’s e-mail.  607 F.3d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2010).  This activity was not done 
at the government’s request, but reported pursuant to an unrelated statute that requires 
mandatory reporting of suspected violations of child pornography regulations.  Id.  
Professor Steven R. Morrison has suggested that ISPs be treated as state actors for any 
search of user’s e-mail.  See Steven R. Morrison, What the Cops Can’t Do, Internet 
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Cloud providers may also look for ways to empower customers and law 
enforcement to acquire forensic data through self-help.  This capability is 
admirable and would free the provider from the burden of doing all the 
work.  It would also be an attractive feature to potential security-minded 
clients.  Regardless of who does the search, whether the provider or law 
enforcement, this approach raises two new questions, which apply equally 
to civil litigation: first, where can the search be done, and second, what 
law applies?  
 
C.  Jurisdictional Difficulties and Costs of Implementation 
 
[42] Consider an example that illustrates this problem.  Imagine that a 
cloud provider incorporated in California has a data center in Virginia.  A 
Washington, D.C. court issues a warrant for data residing in the Virginia 
data center.  A New York resident owns the data.  If the provider executes 
the search, it does so from a computer terminal in California.  The 
provider also provides the FBI with access to search remotely from their 
offices in D.C.  We propose that where the search is done (inside the 
United States) is immaterial and that California law should control.  The 
interconnected, networked nature of a national or global company makes 
where the search is conducted irrelevant.  Even if the provider physically 
executes the search in California, it still accesses the data remotely, 
flowing across many interstate networks to the Virginia data center.  It 
follows, however, that the location of the provider (in this example, 
incorporated and governed by California law) should be the operative 
jurisdiction, regardless of where the search occurs. 
  
[43] Upon execution of a warrant, the cost of cloud-based ESI 
collection and production could be expensive.164  The situation is not 
entirely analogous to the civil case of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 
                                                                                                                     
Service Providers Can: Preserving Privacy in Email Contents, 16 VA. J. L. & TECH. 253, 
257 (2011). 
164 See David Degnan, Accounting for the Costs of Electronic Discovery, 12 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 151, 151 (2011). 
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(“Zubulake IV”). 165   In Zubulake IV, the majority of the $273,649 
production costs stemmed from restoring five offline magnetic tapes and 
attorney fees.166  Data stored in the cloud is clearly online and available 
for access.  But the physical act of locating and copying the data may still 
take considerable time.  For example, Amazon offers an export service, 
which copies and mails customers’ data in a storage device.167  This 
service costs $80 per storage device handled plus $2.49 per data-loading 
hour.168  These costs are unlikely to approach the costs of magnetic tape 
restoration, but the costs to analyze large data volumes will likely dwarf 
the data production costs.169  Importantly, an IaaS cloud provider may be 
unable to search the corpus of data and produce specific evidence (e.g., a 
particular file), but rather would have to hand over the whole data set.170 
 
IV.  RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES 
 
[44] Part II discussed the logistics and pitfalls of obtaining cloud data.  
This section describes defenses and responses that could discredit that 
evidence.  Some issues parallel the scrutiny of any evidence, including the 
Daubert or Frye tests.171  Other issues arise explicitly from the use of 
cloud technology, such as environment complexity and jury 
comprehension.   
                                                
165 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
166 Id. at 289-90. 
167 AWS Import/Export, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/importexport/ 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2012).  
168 Id. 
169 If a cloud customer arbitrarily had two terabytes of data in the cloud, it would take 
nearly 10 hours to copy to a USB hard drive, totaling $104.90.  Id.  One article estimates 
forensic analysis averaging $1000 per gigabyte, bringing two terabytes to $2 million.  See 
Degnan, supra note 164, at 162.  
170 See David Colarusso, Note, Heads in the Cloud, A Coming Storm the Interplay of 
Cloud Computing, Encryption, and the Fifth Amendment's Protection Against Self-
Incrimination, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 69, 91 (2011).  
171 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
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[45] It is worth noting that the law deals in imperfect analogies.172  This 
makes explaining the relation between the cloud and the law difficult for 
all involved.  Despite cursory similarities between searching a cloud-based 
file system and a physical filing cabinet, the injustice served by that 
analogy should raise doubt about its applicability. 
 
[46] By their nature, cloud-computing environments are more complex 
than a single computer or a server.173  Cloud environments have many 
layers of implementation that must be trusted to produce authentic data.174  
In 2009, for example, researchers demonstrated a working exploit to break 
out of a virtual machine and attack the host.175  In a real-word situation, 
this could have destroyed confidence in the forensic evidence.  Courts 
have repeatedly ruled that merely showing that an action is possible does 
not prove that it is so. 176   Nevertheless, computer malfunction and 
                                                
172 See Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1789, 1837-38 (2008) (discussing the Race-Sex analogy in Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
173 See William R. Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Cloud Computing and 
Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 237 (2010).  
174 See supra Part II.A. 
175 See Video Demonstrating Cloudburst Module, IMMUNITY INC., 
http://www.immunityinc.com/documentation/cloudburst-vista.html (last visited Aug. 19, 
2012). 
176 See, e.g., Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 731 (Ind. 
1982) (mere possibilities will not suffice to place a fact in issue; “[o]f course, an expert’s 
opinion that something is ‘possible’ or ‘could have been’ may be sufficient to sustain a 
verdict or award when it has been rendered in conjunction with other evidence 
concerning the material factual question to be proved”). The “what if” scenarios for data 
tampering in the cloud are numerous, a non-comprehensive list of which includes: 
(1) data could be tampered with in transit over the network; (2) redundant copies of the 
data could have gotten out of sync; (3) the data owner’s credentials could have been 
compromised, resulting in false data creation or data tampering; (4) there are 
opportunities for many insider threats at the provider; (5) the hypervisor may be insecure 
allowing a malicious user to manipulate other virtual machines; (6) the host operating 
system could be insecure; or (7) there could be weak or no encryption on the provider’s 
internal infrastructure for data in transit or data at rest. 
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malfeasance must be investigated and can cause fact-finders to question 
the evidence.  The hypervisor is especially vulnerable to scrutiny given its 
powerful position to see and manipulate all virtual machines that it 
controls, including concomitant data.177  Many cloud service providers use 
custom proprietary hypervisors that the global security community has 
neither seen nor independently audited.178 
  
[47] This evidentiary complexity can challenge judges and juries who 
lack knowledge about cloud computing.  Such complex evidentiary 
analysis might leave the lay juror “spinning with information too strange 
to digest and often too intimidating to ponder.”179  Much has been written, 
particularly over the last twenty years, about how juries comprehend 
complex evidence, including highly scientific evidence such as DNA.180  
                                                
177 See Jansen & Grance, supra note 102, at 2 (noting that a hypervisor “is an additional 
layer of software between an operating system and hardware platform that is used to 
operate multi-tenant virtual machines and is common to IaaS clouds” and “supports other 
application programming interfaces to conduct administrative operations, such as 
launching, migrating, and terminating virtual machine instances,” which is vulnerable to 
compromise because it “causes an increase in the attack surface” via the “additional 
methods (e.g., application programming interfaces), channels (e.g., sockets), and data 
items (e.g., input strings) an attacker can use to cause damage to the system”). 
178 See, e.g., Clive Longbottom, Will Hypervisors need a Supravisor?, VNUNET, 1-2 
(2008), available at 
http://www.quocirca.com/media/articles/042008/220/Will%20Hypervisors%20need%20a
%20Supravisor.pdf. 
179 Keith E. Broyles, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A Proposal for 
Educating the Lay Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 714 
(1996); see also DONALD E. SHELTON, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN COURT: CHALLENGES IN THE 
TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 117 (Gregg Barak ed. 2010). 
180 See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from 
Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 728-29 (1991) (citing J. JOSEPH F. WEIS, JR. ET 
AL., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
97 (1990), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc.pdf (recommending 
comprehensive examination of how courts handle scientific and technological complexity 
in litigation)). 
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Jurors have almost certainly used the Internet,181 but this says nothing 
about their comprehension of how it or their computer works.  Cloud 
computing is one of today’s most complex computing environments and it 
is likely to challenge even the most technically inclined juror.  As such, 
evidence and expert witness testimony must be presented artfully. 
 
[48] Cloud providers currently execute search warrants and subpoenas 
for law enforcement and litigants.182  In this regard, cloud providers act no 
differently than any other Internet-based entity.  But doing so may raise a 
conflict of interest.183  Cloud providers are interested in protecting their 
reputations, so they are not likely disinterested.184  Furthermore, the 
provider may have neither the discernment nor the authority to determine 
what other evidence is relevant, responsive, or in plain view.185  Lastly, in 
                                                
181 See Internet Adoption, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT  (2012), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Internet-Adoption.aspx 
(noting that, as of April 2012, 82% of American adults use the Internet). 
182 See supra Part III.B. 
183 See, e.g., David D. Cross & Emily Kuwahara, E-Discovery and Cloud Computing: 
Control of ESI in the Cloud, 1 EDDE J., no. 2, Spring 2010 at 3, available at 
http://www.crowell.com/documents/e-discovery-and-cloud-computing-control-of-esi-in-
the-cloud.pdf (noting that “[w]ith a third-party in possession of data that parties to 
litigation may view as their own (or a court may view as belonging to them), issues 
surrounding the duties to preserve and produce become more pronounced.”); see also 
Gruenspecht, supra note 14, at 545, 551 (noting that cloud service providers have a “lack 
of interest in disputing governmental requests,” but that, for document creators, “[t]he 
privacy problem presented is clear: searching [electronic storage] in a comprehensive 
way can expose both crimes and embarrassing private information that can be admissible 
in court under the plain view exception”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
184 See ACHIEVING DATA PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD, PONEMON INSTITUTE LLC 3 (June 
2012), available at http://download.microsoft.com/download/F/7/6/F76BCFD7-2E42-
4BFB-BD20-A6A1F889435C/Microsoft_Ponemon_Cloud_Privacy_Study_US.pdf.  But 
see Gruenspecht, supra note 14, at 550-51 (“A third-party subpoena recipient rarely 
disputes the request, or even the delay of notice.  The problems with subpoenas to cloud 
computing data service providers go beyond the service providers' lack of interest in 
disputing governmental requests.”). 
185 See Gruenspecht, supra note 14, at 551 (“[C]loud computing data holders, unlike 
traditional business records holders, may not be in a position to address the questions of 
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civil matters, providers lack the incentive to do thorough and accurate 
searches, particularly because such searches can be expensive.186  Because 
the requesting parties often lack technical knowledge of the cloud 
providers’ systems—and are often physically remote from the providers 
who execute the searches—those parties’ oversight over those searches is 
often limited or nonexistent.187  Rigorous guidelines, such as how to 
challenge the scope and procedure of the search, are currently lacking or 
absent.  Barring these changes, it would be preferable for an independent 
third party to execute the warrant or subpoena upon a cloud provider.188  
Until the process of how a provider executes a search is well understood, 
however, the requesting party would be wise to call the technicians to 
testify about their methodology.189  As already noted, a party “need not 
                                                                                                                     
relevance and particularity, since they do not know what information they possess.  Even 
a data holder willing to dispute a subpoena may not have sufficient knowledge to argue 
against its unreasonableness.”).  Courts disagree about what constitutes “plain view” in 
digital evidence.  Compare United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521-22 (4th Cir. 
2010) (holding that evidence viewable on a computer or electronic media may be seized 
under the plain view exception), with United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 782, 785-86 
(7th Cir. 2010) (holding that evidence uncovered while searching a computer pursuant to 
a warrant falls within the plain view exception). 
186 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electronically 
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost.”). 
187 See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 183, at 1 (noting that “cloud computing may 
dramatically expand the number of places that ESI may reside—and may significantly 
increase the complexity and difficulty of locating and obtaining that data”).  But cf. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(f); Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-
Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 356 (2008) (noting a Rule 26(f) conference 
requires that “parties must be prepared to disclose information about their computer 
systems, including where and for how long information is maintained”). 
188 See Jerry Archer et al., Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud 
Computing V3.0, CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, 42-43 (2011), 
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/csaguide.v3.0.pdf (noting that a cloud service 
provider “might be tempted to reply” to a request for client data by providing a broad 
range of data to the requestor without questioning the validity of the request). 
189 See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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call each of the technicians who did the search so long as it presents a 
witness who ‘can explain and be cross-examined concerning the manner in 
which the records are made and kept.’”190  
  
[49] The cloud’s nebulous nature makes evidentiary admission difficult.  
The Daubert191 and Frye192 standards measure the scientific validity and 
relevance of forensic evidence.  The Daubert factors include determining 
whether a theory or technique has been tested, whether it has been subject 
to peer review and publication where there is a known error rate, and 
whether the theory or technique is generally accepted within the relevant 
scientific community.193  Similarly, the Frye standard requires that the 
method “be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in 
the particular field.”194  The Supreme Court in Daubert held that Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 superseded Frye as the applicable standard for 
admitting expert scientific evidence in federal courts,195 but some state 
courts still follow the “general acceptance” standard articulated in Frye.196  
  
[50] Because cloud forensics is a relatively new discipline, establishing 
                                                
190 United States v. Cameron, 733 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D. Me. 2010) (citing Wallace 
Motor Sales, Inc. v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049, 1061 (1st Cir. 1985)).  
191 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (holding that 
although scientific evidence does not have to be generally accepted, any evidence 
admitted must be both relevant and reliable). 
192 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (finding that experts should 
be permitted to testify only about scientific principles that are generally accepted in their 
fields). 
193 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
194 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
195 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.6 (“[W]e hold that Frye has been superseded.”). 
196 See, e.g., State v. Sercey, 825 So.2d 959, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Daubert that the Federal Evidence 
Code had superceded [sic] the Frye test in federal court proceedings, Florida has 
continued to adhere to Frye.”). 
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all of these factors is difficult.197  Courts have held that popular forensic 
tools like EnCase have passed the Daubert test in part because of their 
commercial availability, testing by the government,198 long-term use, and 
extensive scientific acceptance. 199   But in the forensic community, 
techniques for remote forensics, let alone cloud forensics, rarely enjoy any 
consensus. 200   Forensic practitioners who are unfamiliar with cloud 
environments are often tempted to use their existing tools like EnCase.201  
Even the advertised features of commercial tools such as EnCase, which 
can be used for remote forensics, have not been tested for accuracy or 
error rate, nor have they been tested in court.202  This software is not 
unassailable.  In 2007, experts analyzed the authentication between the 
remote EnCase client and the server, allegedly finding vulnerability that 
could purportedly allow an attacker to corrupt or falsify data.203  
                                                
197 See Archer et al., supra note 188, at 42 (noting that questions regarding authentication, 
admissibility, and credibility are not easily resolved by establishing that the information 
was stored in the cloud). 
198 The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Computer Forensic Tool 
Testing (CFTT) project is charged with testing, measuring the effectiveness of, and 
certifying digital forensic tools.  NIST evaluated EnCase 6.5 in September 2009, but has 
never evaluated EnCase Enterprise, which includes the remote forensic features.  See 
CFTT Project Overview, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH. (Aug. 20, 2003), 
http://www.cftt.nist.gov/project_overview.htm. 
199 See GUIDANCE SOFTWARE, supra note 2, at 55-66 (summarizing trial and appellate 
court decisions addressing the admissibility of EnCase software). 
200 Id. at 1. 
201 JOSIAH DYKSTRA & ALAN T. SHERMAN, CYBER DEFENSE LAB, DEPARTMENT OF 
CSEE, ACQUIRING FORENSIC EVIDENCE FROM INFRASTRUCTURE-AS-A-SERVICE CLOUD 
COMPUTING: EXPLORING AND EVALUATING TOOLS, TRUST, AND TECHNIQUES 7-8 (Apr. 
18, 2012), http://publications.csee.umbc.edu/publications/560 (follow 
“DFRWS_Dykstra.pdf” hyperlink). 
202 See Archer et al., supra note 188, at 97 (explaining that until accepted best practice 
guidelines are developed, it is unclear whether the analysis results for cloud will stand up 
in court).  
203 See U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, Vulnerability Note VU912593: 
Guidance EnCase Enterprise uses weak authentication to identify target machines, U.S. 
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[51] As one district court noted, “[i]t is the rare case that a litigant does 
not allege some deficiency in the production of electronically stored 
information.” 204   Producing cloud-based evidence is no different, 
particularly since that kind of evidence will likely remain novel for years 
to come.  
  
[52] Many issues can be raised about the deficiency of production of 
cloud-based ESI.  Such questions may include:  
 
(1) Who from the provider executed the search warrant, what 
were their credentials, and how was the search conducted? 
 
(2) Can the technician who executed the search attest to the 
data’s reliability and authenticity, including: 
   
 (a) the security of the workstation used to execute the search, 
  
(b) the security of the network to prevent data tampering over 
the network, and  
 
 (c) a record of who had access to the data? 
 
(3) Does the provider maintain aggressively enforced records 
management policies that can provide authenticity and 
authentication of the data, perhaps in the form of data 
provenance? 
 
(4) Can the provider attest to the reputation and integrity of the 
cloud infrastructure, including the hypervisor and host operating 
system? 
 
                                                                                                                     
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/912593 
(last updated Nov. 20, 2007). 
204 Covad Commc’ns. Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 5, 13 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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(5) Is it possible that important evidentiary data once existed and 
has been deleted, and if so, is there any record of it? 
 
As these questions illustrate, the most vulnerable aspects of cloud 
discovery are expert-witness testimony and the forensic methodology 
used.205 
  
[53] Finally, cases addressing cloud-based evidence are unlikely to 
produce much definitive judicial guidance because the technology is 
relatively novel.206  Cloud computing technology has evolved over time 
and continues to change regularly.207  Adjudicating too narrowly on cloud-
specific issues would be premature even though courts can, and do, 
broadly apply certain established principles (e.g., civil and criminal rules 
of evidence, Fourth Amendment search and seizure).208  In fact, Justice 
Sotomayor’s recent concurring opinion discusses potentially changing 
attitudes about the expectation of privacy in data given to third parties in 
the digital age: “people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”209 
                                                
205 See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 183, at 5.  
206 See Christine Soares, Applying E-Discovery Best Practices to Cloud Computing, 
LAW.COM, (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202541881944. 
207 Amazon Web Services has announced new features or service changes at least one 
time per month during 2011 and 2012.  Amazon Web Services Releases, AMAZON, 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsWebservices (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2012).  Other providers have a similar pace of change. 
208 See Matthew A. Verga, Cloudburst: What Does Cloud Computing Mean to Lawyers?, 
5 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 41, 48-49 (2010) (discussing the application of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to cases involving cloud computing). 
209 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More 
fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.  
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[54] Cloud computing is a tremendous advancement in the history of 
computation, due in large part to technological convergence.210  The 
economics of the paradigm will drive companies and individuals to 
increase growth and adoption rates.  Where the people, the data, and the 
money go, so follows crime and litigation.211  While investigators and 
litigators struggle with the emerging problems of acquiring and analyzing 
cloud data, the law must prepare for evidentiary challenges associated 
with acquiring and presenting cloud data.  The first public cases involving 
cloud-based ESI are emerging and those involved in those cases have a 
rare opportunity to develop electronic discovery.212 
  
[55] The issues presented here are not wholly unique to cloud 
computing and we stress that these issues can also be raised regarding 
other Internet-derived data, such as social networks and web-based e-mail.  
Some important choices must be made to improve the approach to online 
data.  We have proposed three new ideas.  First, online users should have a 
reasonable expectation of their online data’s geographic location. 213  
Second, cloud providers should not be permitted to execute search 
warrants or subpoenas without the introduction of more rigorous operating 
guidelines.214  Third, remote forensics should be permitted from anywhere, 
guided by the laws of the provider’s forum.215  If implemented, these 
changes will likely provide a stronger foundation to gathering and 
                                                
210 See Araiza, supra note 39, at 7-8; Couillard, supra note 50, at 2216. 
211 See Archer et al., supra note 188, at 35; J. Mark Ramseyer, Litigation and Social 
Capital: Divorces and Traffic Accidents in Japan, in THE HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN 
CENTER FACULTY DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, No. 727, at 6 (2012), available at  
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_727.pdf. 
212 See Verga, supra note 208. 
213 See supra Part III.A. 
214 See supra Part III.B. 
215 See supra Part IV. 
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analyzing cloud-computing evidence in ways that are more robust and 
defensible. 
 
